Abstract-The performance of many emerging communication paradigms depend on high levels of cooperation amongst the peers in the network. Although an individual's best strategy may be to selfishly consume resources without reciprocation, the optimal social performance requires agents in the network to behave in an altruistic manner. This paper considers a P2P data dissemination scenario, and applies an autonomic trust protocol that forms social network structures to incentive cooperation. Trust links are formed according to the simple criterion that 'individuals seek to interact with others at least as cooperative as themselves' and these links are used to prioritise the choice of peers to interact with. The success of the protocol is validated through a prisoner's dilemma based simulation which uses the similarity of interest between peers to define pay-offs. While the variation in interests reduces the average payoff (per iteration) received by the most cooperative individuals, only the most 'divergent' and uncooperative nodes are heavily affected and ostracized from interaction by other cooperative nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation and the ability to trust that another party will reciprocate cooperation is of high relevance to a number of emerging communication systems and applications. These include, for example, contemporary distributed electronic systems such as peer-to-peer networks; mobile ad-hoc networks; and more recently opportunistic and pervasive networks. Trust and reputation models have been developed by authors to introduce incentive mechanisms for reciprocation within groups by encouraging interactions between cooperative individuals while limiting the opportunities for defective behaviours.
This paper models the scenario where agents interact for content sharing and builds on a dynamic trust protocol introduced in [1] . We introduce agents with individual interest profiles and we assume that each agent derives its utility relative to these interests. Agent's own behaviours (cooperation level), interests and first-hand observation of others (history of past interactions) are the main components that drive the formation and maintenance of social groups of similarly cooperative individuals (among which interaction should be prioritized).
Experimental results show that the decentralized system remains successful in incentivising cooperative over selfish behaviours in this more realistic application scenario. That is, nodes accepting resources from others while not reciprocating by pushing any of their own resources are ostracised, thus increasing the utility attained by cooperative individuals. In addition, our results show how system performance is affected by the interest preferences of different groups, where the global utility of the system is maximised when all nodes share the same interest profile.
II. RELATED WORK
Several authors have investigated the importance of trust and reputation models as incentives to cooperation within networks of agents. It is widely recognised that uncooperative behaviours are only capable of partial benefits since they produce positive utilities to single individuals whereas the most altruistic elements of the community are heavily penalized [2] . A fundamental principle is that of reciprocity, which has been used in several sociological studies of social dilemmas and agent based modeling [3] and it is also recognised to be one of the principal incentives to acquire positive reputation for reciprocative actions [4] . Reciprocity is behind the well known 'tit for tat' strategy that can be applied in the game theory for the IPD [5] .
Cooperative and altruistic behaviours have been applied to variations of the P2P paradigm such as Mobile Peer-to-Peer (MP2P) which adds a spatial dimension in which mobile entities can interact and exchange resources [6] . Social MP2P networking (SMP2P) further extends this concept for either single or multi-hop communication by exploiting 'social structures' between devices based, for example, on previous cooperative interactions between them [7] . This has led to a number of applications in the field of Mobile ad Hoc Networks [8] and Opportunistic Networks [9] .
A similar approach is used in [10] , in which locally induced social groups are based on self-similarity of interests of the most frequently encountered nodes. Sharing of membership information in social communities is used for a more effective placement of resources and their consequent retrieval from the mobile network. Enforcement and incentive based techniques can also be dynamically applied to gain control over the average cooperation level of the community. Beyond reciprocity of the actions made by individuals, other incentives for cooperation have been socially modeled [11] , basing on self-similarity between nodes invoking altruism.
Similarity is often measured by introducing observable traits or tags. Tags are useful meta-data because they are potentially very flexible in representing physical spaces and people as well as content [12] . The use of shared tags in content organization (collaborative tagging) has been widely used as a basis for suggestion and recommendation systems [13] and can be successfully used to organize the network in social communities [14] .
III. TRUST MODEL
In [1] an abstract protocol is described for encouraging cooperation between parties where interactions are modeled as single instances of a Prisoners Dilemma game. Nodes gain a positive utility when their partner cooperates, while they pay a price (negative or neutral utility) when defected against. Pseudocode is shown in Figure 1 with the related parameters defined in Table I . We summarise in the following the key aspects of the algorithm:
• Relationship formation: The basis for forming relationships is that each individual seeks to interact with a peer that is at least as cooperative as itself. Nodes assess the average payoff they have received from each peer over a recent number of interactions, and invite to form a relationship those whose average payoff per interaction is at least that which they would expect if it had the same level of cooperation. The invited node will then accept the invitation provided their average payoff per interaction is above some threshold, defined as v accept = v coop .α, where α ∈ [0, 1] is a scaling factor representing how risk averse the node is. Nodes can drop relationship links whenever the average payoff per interaction (over some time window) falls beneath v accept .
• Peer selection: A node v i chooses an opponent to invite using a roulette wheel selection. Each individual in the social group of v i (those nodes with which v i has formed a relationship) is assigned a weight based on the payoff v i has received from v j over their recent interactions. The probability of selecting an opponent outside of this social group is weighted by the recent payoff produced by all nodes not belonging it. Note that this probability can become significant whenever nodes present social groups of very limited size.
• Acceptance: A node v i agrees to an invitation to play from v j if and only if v i 's recent history of interaction with v j has yielded a non-negative payoff (with a small probability of forgiving a node giving negative payoff).
In the absence of a specific protocol during the IPD the selfish strategy is best, with the defective nodes gaining the highest utility at the expense of the most cooperative individuals. This is shown in Figure 1 , in which selection of pairs is conducted at random and nodes are enforced to play a game session at each interaction (Enforced Cooperation). However, when the PD sessions are played following the protocol described here, this tendency is reversed, with the most cooperative nodes receiving the highest payoffs (Social Networking Model) (see [1] for further details). 
When nodes i and j interact, the payoff accrued by each node from content sharing represents the similarity of their interest distributions, defined as U ij : To enable direct comparison with the results of previous simulations [1] that applied the same model to the original PD scenario, the payoffs are normalised as follows. We calculate a theoretical maximum payoff mp over all pairs of nodes:
This value is used to normalise the payoff to the range [0, 2] so that:
In common with other content dissemination studies (e.g. [10] ), we quantify the similarity of the interests of node v j to those of v i using the Kullback Leibler divergence [15] where a divergence of 0 means nodes v i and v j have identical interest distributions. :
We modify in this work the payoff table for the PD game to add a fixed cost C of transferring content to the cooperation strategy, as seen in Table II , in order to simulate a more realistic data dissemination scenario. If an agent chooses to cooperate it pushes one of its carried resources to the currently connected node and, consequently, a cost is incurred. There is no cost incurred by a defecting agent who pushes no content. If the cost of cooperation is positive (C > 0) then a node's best strategy is to defect, as this maximises the payoff received regardless to the particular strategy chosen by its opponent. However, as long as individuals share sufficient common interests (U ij − C > 0), the total utility is maximised when they pairwise cooperate.
To allow direct comparison with the results obtained with the original PD payoff matrix (see [1] ), the cost C of cooperation is set as: Table II  MODIFIED PD PAYOFF TABLE   IV . EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS This Section shows and discusses the results obtained by a number of simulations in which the modified trust protocol, described in Section III, has been applied to a network of agents presenting different preferences of interests.
In this work we adopt the setting for the parameters that showed the best performance in [1] . Cooperation levels defining individuals behaviours are assigned within the range [0,1] according to an uniform random distribution.
We then define a set of M interests for each node according to Zipf's law [16] to produce relative interest values for each interest, F m . This reflects a 'global' probability distribution of interests derived from a real web application. We consider a population of 100 agents partitioned in a number of 'interest communities' V 1 , . . . , V N , so that all nodes belonging to the same community share the same profile of interests.
We have conducted experiments with one community (coinciding with the whole network), five and ten. For each combination of numbers of interests and number of interest communities we have performed and averaged five different runs using different random seeds values (used in the criteria for selection and acceptance to play defined in Section III). All experiments shown in this work correspond to runs conducted for 5000 iterations. Table III shows the distribution of interests for a sample case corresponding to four different interests and five communities. Each of the communities shares the same profile of interests defined by a permutation of the original Zipf distribution with four tags. Table IV shows for the same example the values of the 'divergence' metric defined in Section III. Figure 2 shows payoff per iteration against cooperation for sample scenarios with one, five, and ten communities of interests, each of them presenting distributions using four interests These experiments show that when nodes have different interest profiles (i.e. there is more than one interest community) the payoff received per iteration reduces considerably with the number of communities in the network. Figure 3 shows a sample case with four interests and five communities by examining the average payoff received for each node against their cooperation from the point of view of each single community. It appears clear that for one community only there is no real correlation between payoff and cooperation. In fact, for community one even its most cooperative nodes appear unable to produce high payoff values. As shown in Table IV this community is revealed to be the one showing the greatest divergence with any of the others (i.e. that whose interest profile shows the largest diversity against the rest of the population).
A. Correlation between Divergence and Social Links
Because of the way the payoff matrix is defined, see Table II , the payoff received by nodes in a specific community becomes inevitably low when interacting with nodes outside of the community itself. As a consequence, when the divergence is large this reduces the ability of its nodes to form social links with other nodes outside the same community. Figure 4 plots the average number of social links formed between any pair of communities at each iteration against 
B. Correlation between Average Payoff and Social Links
As the divergence of a specific community is large, according to the correlation diagram shown in Figure 4 we can expect that each of the nodes belonging to that community presents a limited social group size. This is shown by the plot in Figure 5 , which gives the relation between a nodes cooperation and its number of social links for each of the different communities partitioning the original network. The curves show a behaviour comparable to that of Figure 3 : the most cooperative nodes belonging to all of the interest communities (except community one) increase their number of social links more than linearly. The average payoffs received by the nodes which fail to maintain social groups of significant size will also be affected, since this reduces their chances of cooperation with other highly cooperative nodes not belonging to their social groups of trust. Moreover, in the selection process all of the nodes outside the social group of a node v i are weighted with the same probability value (equal to the average of the utility they produced to v i within the memoryspan window m). This will inevitably include also the least cooperative nodes in the population. Hence whenever a node has a social group of particularly limited size the probability of playing a session outside its social neighbourhood can become significant and, as a consequence, the average return in terms of payoff heavily penalised. This is confirmed by Figure 6 showing the (positive) correlation between average payoff (per iteration) and number of social links, with the nodes that maximise the number of their social relationships producing the greatest utilities.
In particular, the most 'divergent' community (one) is composed of nodes not sharing interests with the majority of the network, and also lacks a significant number of highly cooperative nodes. This interest community fails to maintain social links above a minimum threshold and appears unable to produce any substantial payoff values. This results in even its most cooperative agents being ostracised from forming trust links and interacting with other cooperative nodes in the population, thus confirming and explaining the poor performance observed in Figure 3 .
C. Partial adherence to trust protocol
The experiments presented in the previous sections have shown how the most 'divergent' nodes in the network gain little or no utility from the application of the trust protocol. As such, there is no incentive for them to adhere to the protocol. This is considered in Figure 7 which shows payoff against cooperation for a scenario in which the nodes of the first community do not form social groups to prioritize interaction and play every PD session when asked. The plot clearly shows that the performance of the most cooperative nodes belonging to this community has worsened considerably (see Figure 3 for comparison). In fact they are now not only subjected to ostracism by the majority of the network but also inevitably exposed to exploitation by defective nodes of low cooperation level.
However, all of the agents belonging to other interest communities (all sharing very similar profiles of interests) remain unaffected and are still able to successfully prevent the exploitation of malicious nodes including those belonging to the non-adhering community (that only show a little increase of their payoff values).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper engages a trust model to apply to a data dissemination scenario in which a network of agents pairwise connect and exchange tagged resources. Each agent is characterized by a profile of interests (tags) representing its preferences and an utility is realised according to how well a received resource matches its own distribution of interests. Simulation is performed through an adaptation of the IPD in which the original payoff matrix has been modified in order to better reflect a resource dissemination scenario.
The model is based on social networks of trust by means of which cooperative agents prioritize and reciprocate interactions, thus protecting themselves from being exploited by uncooperative nodes. Social links are placed in the first instance on the principle that 'individuals seek to interact with others at least as cooperative as themselves' by observing the payoff received during the history of previous encounters. Note that the placement of links will then depend on the self-similarity with other network agents in terms of both behaviour (cooperation level) and interest preference.
The application of the protocol is successful in reversing the common trend in which selfish individuals (who receive but do not forward any resources to neighbouring peers) get the most benefit by increasing their payoffs at the expense of cooperative and altruistic behaviours. Diverse communities having different interests worsens the overall performance of the system. Here individual utilities are reduced since their agents will receive lower payoffs when interacting with peers belonging to a different 'interest community'.
There is a strong correlation between divergence of interest profiles and number of social links placed. Hence, social groups of trust will be formed primarily between nodes belonging to the same 'community of interests'. As a consequence, the most 'divergent' agents are prevented from forming links outside their own interest communities and this will affect significantly their final performances. In fact, the lack of social links reduces the opportunity to play with other cooperatives nodes while exposes agents to the exploitation by defective and uncooperative behaviours. This form of ostracism can dramatically reduce the outcomes of the most divergent communities whenever they also present, in average, medium or low cooperation levels. However, the rest of the network (composed by nodes with very similar interest profiles) remains unaffected and its nodes still show a positive correlation between their payoff and cooperation levels. Note that this happens even when the community composed by the most most dissimilar nodes does not adhere at all to the trust protocol.
